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A b s tr a c t
Does the pursuit o f  equality in post-apartheid education require the re­
moval o f  difference? This article examines the concepts o f  difference and  
equality by exploring two contemporary texts in political philosophy. It is 
argued that the pursuit o f  equality can and should, under certain circum­
stances, accommodate difference in the form  o f  decentralisation and private 
schools.
1. Introduction
Most political parties and movements in South Africa now accept, as the outcome 
of negotiations, a unitary democratic state with a common citizenship for all and a 
degree o f decentralisation to nine regions. It is widely, although not universally, 
agreed that a single state is needed to provide the authority and resources neces­
sary to initiate and control a process of redistribution o f social goods, including 
education, to remove historical inequalities.
Since the process o f negotiation towards a post-apartheid era began, it has also 
been commonly assumed that in place of an educational system based on differ­
ence and extreme inequalities, we will need one which tries with vigour to redress 
inequality. Critics o f education under apartheid emphasised the inequalities in 
South African education, drawing attention to differences in access and outcomes 
between white and black schooling. For some critics the justification for these in­
equalities was reflected until fairly recently in official policy -  a policy which was 
seen to justify both segregation, assuming that there should be different education 
for different groups, and differences in provision. The schooling system became 
a focus for mass protest against segregation and inequality.
An earlier version o f this paper was presented at the Vlllth World Congress of 
Comparative Education Societies, Charles University, Prague, July 1992.
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The question which this article sets out to address is: if  the differences inherent in 
apartheid education produced inequality, must post-apartheid educational policy 
try to remove difference in its quest for greater equality? Freer (1992:4) for 
example, writes that "the strategy for the next decade must surely be aimed at the 
eradication of both material and perceived differences". This could be interpreted 
as an assertion that in the pursuit of equality we will need to remove as many of 
the differences in the education provided for all South African children as we can.
Current perspectives on equality and difference in South African education policy 
focus on two related themes. The one theme is the question o f whether a future 
education system should be highly centralised or decentralised. Some would 
wish to argue that only a centralised system, in terms o f factors which include 
funding and the curriculum, can effectively carry out a policy o f equalising access 
to and outcomes o f schooling. Others would claim that only a decentralised sys­
tem can cater for cultural and regional diversity. The second theme is the future 
o f private schooling in South Africa. While the National Party government did 
not encourage private schooling in the period after its election victory in 1948, its 
policy seemed to change with the Private Schools Act o f 1986 and the introduc­
tion of the Clase Models in 1990, subsequently revised, which have allowed 
some white schools the option o f becoming private or semi-private schools. 
Those who favour these developments defend such schools as a means o f allow­
ing cultural minorities to exercise greater autonomy in the provision of education 
for their children. For their opponents, such schools entrench inequality by 
handing over state-owned facilities to already privileged communities.
This article will argue, from the perspective o f nonnative political philosophy, 
that in the new democratic form of public life which we seek, premised on the 
common good, a commitment to equality is not a commitment to sameness, or to 
the rejection o f difference. I refer to difference as social or group difference, in­
cluding cultural or ethnic difference, as against material differences in the pro­
vision o f funding and facilities. In arguing that a future educational system can 
both promote equality and accommodate difference, the article will begin by ex­
ploring a current feminist perspective on difference and equality in the work of 
Iris Young. This view will then be connected with Michael W alzer’s idea of 
complex equality, as a way of reconciling difference and equality in a future 
South African educational system. The implications for South African education 
of these two views of equality, written about American society, will be explored.
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2. D ifference and justice
2.1 Group difference and equality
Recent feminist scholarship has stimulated new debate on a range of issues in 
social theory. Iris Young’s work on difference and gender (1990a, 1990b) opens 
up fresh perspectives on difference in the broader political context. I will suggest 
that her problematisation o f distributive justice and universal citizenship, and her 
treatment of the significance of group difference offer an instructive view o f the 
problems on which this article focuses.
Young argues for an alternative to the usual construal o f justice as a distributive 
matter. The distributive paradigm emphasises a notion of justice as the allocation 
o f material goods or social positions at the expense of social, non-material goods 
including "decision-making power and procedures, division of labour, and cul­
ture" (Young, 1990a: 15). While she accepts that distributive questions do have a 
place in an acceptable theory of justice, Young’s concern is the tendency to re­
duce problems o f social justice to distributive issues. She defends a social onto­
logy which expresses the feminist themes of relations and processes, rather than 
things, as central to an enabling conception of justice:
Ju s tice  sh o u ld  re fe r  n o t on ly  to  d is trib u tio n , b u t a lso  to  th e  in s titu tio n a l 
c o n d itio n s  n ecessa ry  fo r the  d ev e lo p m en t and  e x e rc ise  o f  in d iv id u a l ca ­
p ac itie s  and  co llec tiv e  co m m u n ica tio n  an d  co o p e ra tio n  (Y o u n g , 1990a:39).
A further problem with contemporary theories o f justice is their association with 
the ideal o f the universal, homogeneous civic public. The ideal o f universal citi­
zenship insists that laws and rules should be "the same for all and apply to all in 
the same way" (Young, 1990b: 114) -  which perpetuates injustice by emphasising 
what citizens share in common rather than how they are different. Defending the 
notion o f a differentiated, heterogeneous public, she argues instead that where 
there are social group differences, where some groups are oppressed and others 
privileged, oppression is more likely to be undermined if group differences are 
acknowledged. Arguing that group differentiation is not only inevitable but also 
desirable, Young calls for a politics that attends to group difference rather than 
trying to repress it. The primary principle o f justice is the equal treatment of 
groups.
Young defines a social group not in the first instance by some shared attribute, 
but by a common sense o f identity held by its members. "...[I]t is identification 
with a certain social status, the common history that social status produces, and 
self-identification that define the group as a group" (Young, 1990a:44).
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I argue that sometimes recognizing particular rights for groups is the only 
way to promote their full participation. Some fear that such differential 
treatment again stigmatises these groups ... this is true only if  we continue 
to understand difference as opposition -  identifying equality with sameness 
and difference with deviance or devaluation (Young, 1990a: 11).
Young cites as examples o f social movements which have held that it is more lib- 
eratory to assert group difference: American Indians, women, gays, lesbians, old 
people, black and Hispanic Americans, and the disabled. Rejecting an assimila- 
tionist ideal, she observes that in the "democratic cultural pluralism" (Young, 
1990a: 174) which is implicit in the assertion of a positive sense o f group diffe­
rence by these emancipatory movements, the good society is not one which 
transcends or eliminates group difference. In the good society, there is respect 
between socially and culturally differentiated groups, whose differences are 
mutually affirmed. Formal equality is insufficient as it does not remove social dif­
ferences, and it can have oppressive consequences, for "rhetorical commitment to 
the sameness of persons makes it impossible even to name how those differences 
presently structure privilege and oppression" (Young, 1990a: 164). Hence 
Young’s defence o f a politics o f group assertion, in which oppressed groups are 
organised separately and others, especially the more privileged, are excluded.
This does not mean that Young would sanction all possible politics based on 
group difference, which can also have an oppressive meaning when defined as 
"absolute otherness, mutual exclusion, categorical opposition" (Young 1990a: 
169). For South Africans pondering how to respond to difference after apartheid, 
Young’s analysis is illuminating, for apartheid, and its accompanying schooling 
system, was founded on an ideology o f difference as exclusion, opposition and 
absolute otherness. For those o f us whose impulse might consequently be to deny 
difference, it is important to note Young’s observation that difference as exclu­
sion and opposition is actually a denial o f difference because universalizing 
norms prevent the recognition and affirmation o f a group’s own specific identity. 
What Young calls the politics o f difference is a means o f confronting a fear o f 
specificity, not by essentializing difference, but by trying to develop an understan­
ding o f group difference as shifting and ambiguous. In accommodating a hetero­
geneous public in a just polity, group difference would be publicly acknowledged 
rather than ignored. A heterogeneous, democratic public would publicly discuss 
issues and make decisions based on principles o f justice.
Even more so should group differences o f nation or ethnicity be accepted.
In the twentieth century the ideal state is composed o f a plurality o f nations 
or cultural groups, with a degree o f self-determination and autonomy com­
patible with federated equal rights and obligations o f citizenship (Young, 
1990a: 180).
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2.2 Group difference and education in South Africa
Young’s treatment o f equality and difference raises fundamental and difficult pro­
blems in the South African context. It is a theory open to abuse by apologists for 
continued white privilege. But it is also a challenge to confront difference at a 
time when it seems safer to avoid the issue and declare instead a vision of a homo­
geneous public. Her critique of justice perceived simply as a question of the 
distribution of goods warns us that creating equality in South African education is not 
only a matter o f equal material provision of facilities, o f removing differences in 
provision. It should also be understood as a relational, social issue concerned with 
equal development o f collective capacities, as an issue concerning difference. To 
assume that we have a universal, undifferentiated public would be to ignore this.
While acknowledging and fostering group difference does provide an imperative 
to consider the fact that within the educational system certain groups might be 
more justly treated if they are recognised rather than if they are subsumed as part 
of a homogeneous public, this does not necessarily imply that each group must 
have its own schools. Nor does it require that private schools should be provided 
for those who choose to attach educational significance to membership of a 
group, an option in any case less likely to be available to groups without the 
necessary financial resources. But it does have a bearing on the question o f the 
continued existence of private and indeed state schools -  especially religious 
schools -  that offer access to membership of a group, subject to their publicly 
putting their case for special provision. While Young’s concern is the oppressed, 
and she would not regard whites or Afrikaners, for example, as oppressed, it is 
not unreasonable to claim that her concerns will be applicable to such minorities 
once they share power with others. Furthermore, once the primary issue in South 
African politics is no longer a confrontation largely between black and white, 
other minorities may emerge claiming a need for differentiated citizenship. 
Young’s rejection of equality as sameness is especially pertinent to the issue of 
gender. An educational system that sets out to provide equal education for girls 
will fail if  it is merely distributive, offering them the same formal access as boys. 
Among other things, it will have to take drastic steps to address problems of 
sexual harassment o f girls in many schools, possibly by means o f separate 
education in some areas.
3. Complex equality
3.1 Educational goods
In his Spheres o f  .Justice (1983) Michael Walzer proposes an alternative to 
‘simple’ or literal equality, where everyone has the same share o f social goods
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like wealth, power or education. In most societies there is a dominant good or 
goods which define the value o f  goods in other spheres. D om inance prevails 
when a group o f people acquires a monopoly over a dominant good. For exam­
ple, in capitalist societies wealth is dominant and determines the value o f other 
goods, allowing those who possess it to convert it into other social goods such as 
office and political power. The use o f social goods is not limited to their intrinsic 
meaning, but some people are able to monopolise social goods in order to benefit 
from their dominance by commanding other goods. As neither monopoly nor 
dominance is ever complete, however, the ruling class is inevitably challenged by 
others, who want to set up different ways o f converting goods.
Arguing that political egalitarianism aims at achieving a society which is free 
from domination, and taking criticism o f the structures and relationships o f  domi­
nance as the task o f a theory o f justice, Walzer describes as complex equality a 
set o f relationships under which domination is not possible. As domination is 
mediated by social goods, people could be considered equal when social goods 
are controlled so that they cannot act as a means o f domination. Under complex 
equality W alzer proposes that there would be separate, autonomous spheres o f 
justice, dominance being reduced by restricting the convertibility o f goods from 
one sphere to another. Within each sphere inequalities may have to be allowed. 
So the form o f the principles of justice is pluralistic because the reasons for dis­
tributing various social goods will differ, and their distribution will follow differ­
ing procedures conducted by different agents. W alzer proposes the distributive 
principle that:
No social good x should be distributed to men and women who possess 
some other good y merely because they possess y and without regard to the 
meaning o f x (Walzer, 1983:20).
Education is one o f the social goods which W alzer discusses in developing his 
theory o f justice. He suggests that schooling is a social good which requires its 
own set o f processes o f distribution. Schools and educational authorities, in turn, 
have to distribute appointments o f teachers, admission o f students to schools, 
authority, marks and promotions, and knowledge itself. If these are to be done in 
accordance with principles o f complex equality, rather than dominance and mono­
poly, the patterns o f distribution "cannot simply mirror the patterns o f the econo­
my and political order, because the goods in question are different goods" 
(Walzer, 1983:198).
In asking how schooling should be distributed, W alzer sympathises to some ex­
tent with Aristotle’s view that "the system o f education in a state must be one and 
the same for all, and the provision o f this system must be a matter o f public ac­
tion" (Walzer, 1983:202). His agreement includes endorsement o f the view that 
education in a democracy requires that all should be able to grasp a common core
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curriculum. Once the core has been grasped, simple equality is no longer appro­
priate and individual abilities and interests should be allowed to shape education, 
including specialized provision to match those abilities and interests.
For Walzer the wider community’s commitment to democracy can be matched by 
democratic practices in schools, if schools are autonomous spheres within the 
community. He is attracted by the argument that "schools can provide a genuinely 
common education only if they are protected from corporate and governmental 
intrusion" (Walzer, 1983:207), which are likely if allowed to intervene to effect 
an unequal distribution o f educational goods.
Proposing the general principle that schools should try to create a pattern o f as­
sociation which anticipates that in which adult men and women are participants, 
Walzer allows that there could be a number o f kinds o f institutions and patterns 
o f association apparently compatible with the education o f democratic citizens, 
and "neither compulsory education nor a common curriculum requires that all 
children go to the same sorts o f school or that all schools stand in the same rela­
tion to the political community" (Walzer, 1983:217).
Although Walzer argues for the importance of public debate and that educational 
goods should be communally provided, he seems prepared to allow some role for 
private schooling -  provided it is not controlled solely by parents and entrepre­
neurs.
I d o n ’t th in k  th a t the re  is an y  need  fo r a fron ta l assau lt on  paren ta l cho ice , 
so lo n g  as its  c h ie f  e ffe c t is to p ro v id e  ideo lo g ica l d iv ersity  on the  m arg ins 
o f  a p re d o m in a n tly  p u b lic  system . In p rin c ip le , ed u ca tio n a l g o o d s shou ld  
n o t be  up  fo r p u rch ase , b u t the  p u rch ase  is to le rab le  i f  it d o e s n ’t ca rry  w ith  
it (as it still does , fo r exam ple , in B rita in  to d ay ) en o rm o u s soc ial ad v an ­
tages. H ere , as in o th e r  areas o f  com m unal p ro v isio n , th e  s tro n g er the  p u b ­
lic sy s tem , th e  e as ie r  o n e  can  be ab o u t the  u ses o f  m o n ey  a lo n g sid e  it. N o r 
is th e re  m u ch  reaso n  to  w o rry  abo u t th o se  p riv a te  sch o o ls  th a t p ro v id e  sp e ­
c ia lized  ed u ca tio n , as long  as sc h o la rsh ip s are  ava ilab le , and  as lo n g  as 
th e re  are  a lte rn a tiv e  ro u te s  to  p u b lic  and  p rivate  o ffice  (W alzer, 1983:219).
3.2 Complex equality and the future of schooling in South Africa
How can W alzer’s theory o f equality help us to deal with moral problems about 
inequality and difference in South African education? South African society, as a 
distinctive example of what Walzer calls dominance, has seen a ruling class ac­
quire and extend its monopoly over a set o f dominant goods which include wealth 
and birth, which have in turn been converted into other social goods, including 
office, political power and -  strikingly -  education. As a particularly prominent 
feature o f the South African crisis, schooling as a social good has been monopo­
lised by whites as a result o f their monopoly over other social goods. And the
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challenge mounted by the oppressed against the dominance o f the ruling class has 
focused strongly on this sphere o f injustice, though it should be added that the 
strategic collapse o f the distinction between the spheres o f education and political 
power is a major factor in the present breakdown o f authority and learning in 
many schools.
It is salutary to consider what simple equality would require if applied in a policy 
of redistribution o f educational goods. Simple equality in the sphere of schooling 
would require drastic state intervention to equalise access and outcomes. Re­
sources and facilities would have to be taken away from some schools and re­
allocated to others. Schools with better equipment and better-qualified teachers 
might have to be penalised so that their students do not continue to benefit from 
the schooling system more than those with access to less satisfactory provision. 
It would be necessary to act against schools or even parents who, after an initial 
re-allocation o f resources, continue to prosper more than others, which in turn 
would require careful and detailed monitoring of all school and extra-school ac­
tivities.
Such a vision of equality would, if  feasible at all, come at a price many o f us 
would not be prepared to pay. But if  we opted for complex equality, how much 
parental choice and diversity could there be? What if, for example, a significant 
proportion of the Afrikaans-speaking population want to argue that provision 
could be made for private or even state Christian schools with a strong emphasis 
on Afrikaans language and culture within a system of complex equality? What o f 
special provision for Muslim girls or for Jewish children?
From the point o f view o f complex equality, it must be possible to defend such 
different provision, provided what W alzer calls the core is available to the 
masses. A further proviso would be that in principle the parents o f children re­
ceiving such special provision are not thereby able to reproduce inequalities by 
buying for their children the advantage o f converting their education into other 
social goods in ways that are clearly denied to other children.
W alzer’s idea o f education as a social good is not one-dimensional. He does not 
see education as a good whose sole purpose is conversion into other goods like 
office, wealth or power -  though he emphasises that in an unequal society that is 
how it works for some. He also sees schools as places where children can learn 
to be participating members o f democratic societies. And he correctly sees edu­
cation as a means for parents to bring their children up as members o f particular 
‘communities o f understanding’. It is conceivable that, provided schooling is not 
inappropriately convertible into other social goods, various Christian schools, for 
example, could be allowed to provide access to a particular community o f under­
standing, though a problem for W alzer’s theory is that the education provided as 
access to some communities o f understanding is likely to enable members o f
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some communities to convert their education into other social goods such as of­
fice. A difficulty that must be recognised is that creating equality in the sphere of 
education, in terms o fW alzer’s theory, depends 011 factors in other spheres which 
are beyond the influence o f those active in the educational sphere. Furthermore, 
while achieving complex equality in the sphere of education depends on the crea­
tion of a strong state educational sector, the private or specialized state schools 
cannot themselves achieve this, although they can influence such a process by 
sharing curriculum innovations and even some of their resources.
4. Conclusion
Having reflected on the central features o f Young’s theory of difference and Wal- 
zer’s notion o f complex equality in relation to South African education, we return 
to the question: must post-apartheid educational policy aim to remove difference 
in a quest for equality? This paper has argued against a strategy of removing dif­
ference. Examination of the concepts o f difference and equality makes it clear 
that, problematic though the issues are, it is possible and desirable to pursue equal 
education while respecting difference.
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